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Auditor’s Attestation of Internal Control and Audit Fees 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) requires top management to 
establish, maintain, and regularly evaluate the effectiveness of the internal control 
over financial reporting (ICOFR), and obtain an auditor’s attestation. In this paper, we 
identify 232 firms that received “Ineffective” audit opinion on the effectiveness of 
ICOFR due to one or more material weakness in internal control (WIC). We examine 
the association between audit fees and the WIC for pre- and post-SOX period. We 
find that highly levered clients with the WIC paid greater audit fees even in the pre-
SOX period and continuously paid the high fees in post-SOX period, whereas the 
loss-making clients with WIC paid higher fees only in post-SOX period. We also find 
evidence that the Big 4 auditors charged higher audit fees for firms with WIC, 
compared with the fee charged by non-Big 4 auditors for firms with WIC. These 
findings suggest that auditors, in terms of their behaviours and pricing mechanism, 
responded to the legal liability environment changes caused by SOX. 
 
Keywords: Internal Control, Audit services, Audit fees, Sarbanes-Oxley Act  
 
 1
Auditor’s Attestation of Internal Control and Audit Fees 
 
  
1. Introduction 
In response to a series of corporate scandals, the U.S. congress passed 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in an attempt to restore the investors’ confidence. 
One of the most salient reforms in the SOX is related to firms’ internal controls over 
financial reporting (ICOFR). Section 404, which became effective for fiscal years 
ending after Nov 2004 for most public firms, requires the management to assess the 
effectiveness of the company’s ICOFR and report its conclusion in the company’s 
annual reports. Section 404 also requires its auditor to review management’s 
assessment and also report its own conclusion regarding the effectiveness of the 
company’s ICOFR.  
We obtained auditors’ opinions on the effectiveness of the ICOFR for our 
samples firms from recently filed 10-K reports and identified material weakness in 
internal controls for the firms that received an “Ineffective” opinion from the auditor 
on the effectiveness of ICOFR. We begin with our study by first investigating whether 
material weaknesses in the ICOFR (henceforth WIC) are priced in the audit fee-
setting process. We expect the WIC to be priced for two reasons. First, auditors apply 
more engagement effort toward detecting possible instances of earnings manipulation 
or accounting errors and therefore charge higher audit fees for the firms that have a 
WIC. Second, by charging higher average billing rates to cover the potential 
incremental costs associated with conducting, staffing, and managing these 
engagements, auditors may try to compensate their exposure to litigation or reputation 
declines associated with material weaknesses in internal control.  
Second, this study examines whether the association between the WIC and 
audit fees becomes stronger after the passage of the SOX (i.e., post-SOX period). This 
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test allows us to infer how the effect of auditors’ assessment of ICOFR on the audit 
fees is associated with a shift in the legal environment in the U.S. by the enactment of 
the SOX. Third, we hypothesize that the impact of the WIC on audit fees is 
differential across the clients, depending on the client-specific risk characteristics. We 
expect that the impact would be exacerbated for high litigation risk clients because in 
the presence of a similar level of WIC, auditors’ exposure to potential legal liability 
would be higher when their clients are subject to greater litigation risks.  Fourth, we 
investigate whether the effect of the WIC on audit fees is related to auditor size. We 
expect Big 4 auditors to require higher audit fees for the clients with WIC because of 
their potentially higher reputation loss and legal loss due to their perceived “deeper 
pockets” for the similar level of WIC, compared with non-Big 4 auditors. Finally, we 
examine whether the association between WIC and audit fees is stronger when the 
nature of material weakness is related to firm-level controls, rather than specific 
account-level or transaction-level controls which may be more “auditable.”  Although 
there have been several studies on the WIC (e.g., Ashbaugh et al., 2005; Doyle et al., 
2005; Ge and McVay, 2005; Hammersley et al., 2005; Hogan and Wilkins, 2005; 
Krishnan, 2005), we have little evidence on these issues as they mostly focus on the 
determinants of internal control deficiencies, the effects on earnings quality, and the 
market reactions to such disclosures. 
Using audit fee data for the period of 2000~2004 and the auditors’ reports 
filed from February 2005 to May 2005, we find that the material weaknesses in 
internal control reported in their auditors’ opinions in response to Section 404 of SOX 
are positively associated with audit fees paid and that the positive relation is mostly 
driven by the association in the post-SOX period (year 2003 and 2004), compared 
with pre-SOX period (year 2000~2002). We also document the interaction between 
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some client-specific risk variables and the WIC has an incrementally significant and 
positive effect on audit fees. More specifically, we find that highly levered clients 
with the WIC paid greater audit fees starting even in the pre-SOX period and 
continuously pay high fees throughout 2003 and 2004, whereas the loss-making 
clients with WIC pay higher fees only in post-SOX period. We also find evidence that 
the Big 4 auditors charge higher audit fees for the clients with WIC, compared with 
non-Big 4 auditors, but it is not clear when they started to charge higher fees, pre- or 
post-SOX periods. However, different from our prediction, we could not find an 
incremental effect of the material weaknesses in firm-level controls on audit fees, 
indicating that both firm-level and specific account-level (or transaction-level) 
controls are important control structures that affect auditors’ fees.  
This paper makes several contributions to our understanding of auditors’ 
attestation to internal control over financial reporting and their fees. First, we first 
employ the internal control data from auditors’ reports in the period after Section 404 
became effective while other prior studies use the sample of internal control 
deficiencies disclosed under management assessment in response to Section 302 of 
the SOX.  To the extent that auditors set their audit fees mainly based on their 
assessment of the effectiveness of clients’ ICOFR, we believe using the WIC data 
opinioned by auditors will reduce potential bias from the assessment difference 
between auditors and clients in the study of the WIC and audit fee relations. Second, 
this study provides evidence that internal control weakness is an important 
determinant of audit fees. While such a relation has been suggested in various 
textbooks, this fundamental driver of audit fees has never been empirically tested to 
date.  This study recognizes a cross-sectional variation in the quality of internal 
control and explicitly takes it into account as a determinant of audit fees. Third, this 
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study sheds some light on the extent of the auditor’s reliance on internal controls to 
reduce substantive procedures. Since the substitution between tests of controls and 
substantive tests is made purely on cost/benefit grounds (see AICPA [1993, AU 
section 319.44]), even when controls are excellent, the link between internal controls 
and accounting irregularities may not be quite as strong as regulators believe. We 
investigate how the audit function may affect the mapping of material weaknesses in 
internal control into audit efforts, audit risk assessments and subsequently audit fees. 
Fourth, we provide evidence on the impact of material weaknesses in internal control 
as an additional type of litigation risk. Simunic and Stein (1996) suggest that audit 
fees do reflect variations in litigation risk based on the archival evidence. However, 
prior research has generally ignored the quality of internal control in the auditor’s 
litigation risk assessment process since the internal control data was not available 
until Section 404 of SOX became effective. Our study provides empirical support for 
the internal control risk in addition to other risks examined in other prior studies and 
show that auditors change their audit fee structure based on WIC and client-specific 
risks. It is also interesting to find that auditors do not uniformly charge higher fees for 
all clients with WIC, but change the fees based on firm-specific risks  In this respect, 
the findings of our study suggest how the auditors, in terms of their behaviours and 
pricing mechanism, respond to the legal liability environment changes caused by 
SOX. The findings of this study can also be applied to different kinds of regulation 
changes such as Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1994, or cross-listing or 
incorporation via direct investment or partnership in foreign countries with different 
legal environments. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we briefly 
discuss the new requirements on internal control disclosures and attestation to 
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implement Sections 302 and 404 of the SOX of 2002 and prior studies related to 
internal control issues. Section 3 presents hypotheses development and section 4 
describes our sample selection and empirical analysis procedures. In section 5, we 
present our empirical results. Section 6 exhibits the results of further analyses on the 
association of the auditor’s attestation and audit fees. The final section concludes the 
paper.   
 
2. Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Audit Fees  
2.1 Background 
 By a string of corporate reporting scandals from late 2001, the credibility of 
public company’s financial reporting and investors’ confidence in the accounting 
information have been severely eroded.  In response, Congress passed the SOX of 
2002 which contains a variety of accounting-related reforms to improve the integrity 
of financial reporting and thus to restore public confidence. One element of the 
reforms is related to the ICOFR reflected in Sections 302 and 404 of the SOX.1  
Section 302, which became effective for quarterly and annual reports covering 
periods that end after August 29, 2002, states that chief executive officers (CEO) and 
chief finance officers (CFO) are directly responsible for the accuracy, documentation 
and submission of all financial reports as well as the internal control structure to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It requires that the CEO and CFO 
evaluate the design and effectiveness of internal controls and disclose any known 
material weakness, fraud, and changes in controls that are likely to have a material 
                                                 
1  Internal control is defined by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) as a process – effected by directors, management, and other personnel – designed 
to provide reasonable assurance of the achievement of objectives in: 1) effectiveness and efficiency of 
operations, 2) compliance with applicable laws and regulations, 3) safeguarding of assets, and 4) 
reliability of financial reporting. Sections 302 and 404 of the SOX mainly focus on the objectives 
related to 4), and this subset of internal control is commonly referred to as ICOFR. 
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effect on financial statements in the future. Section 404, which became effective for 
fiscal years ending after November 15, 2004 for accelerated filers,2 has two main 
parts: Section 404(a) describes management’s responsibility for maintaining an 
adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting as well as 
responsibility for assessing the effectiveness of ICOFR. Section 404(b) mainly 
describes the auditor’s responsibility for attesting to reporting on management’s 
internal control assessment and to the effectiveness of ICOFR.   
Section 302, unlike Section 404, required relatively less extensive 
investigations (e.g., no detailed procedures) and assessments by management and 
more importantly no audit procedures by the auditor. Along with Section 404, the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board has adopted Auditing Standard No. 2, 
An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction 
With an Audit of Financial Statements, which requires an integrated audit of the 
financial statements and ICOFR, resulting in two separate objectives: 1) to express an 
opinion on whether the financial statements are fairly stated, and 2) to express 
separate opinions on management's assessment and the effectiveness of the ICOFR.  
Throughout the Standard, the auditor's attestation to the internal control is referred to 
as the audit of ICOFR. In the process of ICOFR audit, the auditor must obtain 
evidence about whether ICFOR is effective by evaluating management's assessment 
process, identifying significant accounts, relevant assertions, and significant processes, 
and evaluating and testing the design of internal controls.  
                                                 
2 A non-accelerated filer (a U.S. company with market capitalization less than $75 million that has filed 
at least one annual report with the SEC) must first comply with the SOX 404 requirements for its first 
fiscal year ending on or after July 15, 2007. The extension does not apply to a foreign private issuer 
that is an accelerated filer and that files annual reports on Form 20-F or Form 40-F; such an issuer must 
begin to comply with the internal control over financial reporting and related requirements in the 
annual report for its first fiscal year ending on or after July 15, 2006. We exclude non-accelerated filers 
and foreign firms from our sample. 
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The auditor's report must include two opinions on the ICFOR: one on 
management's assessment of ICOFR and one on the effectiveness of ICOFR. The 
auditor is not permitted to conclude that the company's ICFOR is effective if there are 
one or more material weaknesses in the registrant's internal control. In the event of a 
material weakness, the auditor could express an unqualified opinion (i.e., “fairly 
stated”) on management's assessment, so long as management properly identified the 
material weakness and concluded in their assessment that internal control was not 
effective. If the auditor concludes a material weakness exists but management does 
not and therefore makes the conclusion in its assessment that internal control is 
effective, the auditor would render an adverse opinion on management's assessment.3
 
2.2 Prior research      
After the passage of the SOX of 2002, there have been several studies that 
investigate the issues of internal controls, and all of them have found their evidence 
based on the data on the WIC disclosed under Section 302.   
 For example, Ge and McVay (2005) find that disclosing internal control 
weakness is positively associated with business complexity (e.g., multiple segments 
and foreign operation), negatively associated with firm size (e.g., market 
capitalization) and profitability (e.g., return on assets). Doyle et al. (2005) also report 
similar determinants of weakness in the ICOFR and show that firms with the WIC 
have lower earnings quality, as measured by the extent to which accruals map into 
cash flows. Ashbaugh et al. (2005) document that firms with more complex 
operations, recent changes in organization structure, more accounting risk exposure 
                                                 
3 Among our 232 sample firms that received the auditor’s “Ineffective” opinion on the ICOFR, only 
two firms received “not fairly stated” opinion on management assessment of the effectiveness of 
ICOFR and all the others received an unqualified opinion.  This indicates that prior to the issuance of 
the opinion, the auditor and management have agreed on significant deficiency or material weakness in 
ICOFR in most cases once Section 404 is enacted. 
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and less investment in internal control systems are more likely to disclose WIC. They 
also find that firms disclosing a WIC have greater abnormal accruals and more 
frequent restatements of financial restatements to their industry peers, consistent with 
the notion that the WIC results in low quality accounting information.  
Three other studies examine the market’s price reactions to management’s 
disclosure of WIC under Section 302 and find overall negative market reactions. 
DeFranco et al. (2005) and Beneish et al. (2005) find cumulative size-adjusted returns 
of -1.8 percent and -1.73 percent over the three day window surrounding the 
disclosure, using 102 and 336 firms disclosing a WIC, respectively. Similarly, 
Hammersley et al. (2005) find negative size-adjusted returns and increased trading 
volume when the WIC is disclosed in 52 uncontaminated sample firms. 
Krishnan (2005) studies the relation of characteristics of audit committee and 
the occurrence of the WIC for the firms that change auditors. This study is based on 
the data even before the enforcement of Section 302 of SOX as firms that change their 
auditors were required to disclose information on the internal control weakness (if 
any) pointed out by the predecessor auditor when they file 8-K to SEC. Krishnan 
(2005) find that clients with more independent and expert audit committees are less 
likely to have a WIC. 
There has been little empirical evidence on how the WIC is associated with 
audit fees. We observe only one study by Hogan and Wilkins (2005) which find that a 
previous year’s audit fees of firms that disclosed internal control deficiencies under 
Section 302 are higher, which is similar to our results, but the abnormal discretionary 
accruals for those firms not significantly higher. They suggest that auditors constrain 
potential earnings management for firms with severe internal control weakness by 
increasing their level of testing.  
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Our study differs from their study in several points. First, we employ the 
material weakness data under Section 404 which will reduce potential bias from the 
assessment difference between auditors and clients in the association between the 
WIC and audit fees. Second, we use a longer period of audit fee data covering the 
year 2004 (when auditors were required to express audit opinion on ICFOR for the 
first time) and the previous four years while they examine only a previous year’s audit 
fees. Using a longer period audit fee data, we investigate possible changes in the 
association between the WIC and audit fees over the years in the pre- and post- SOX 
periods.  Another additional contribution is that we examine how the effect of the 
WIC on the audit fees cross-sectionally differs, depending on the client-specific 
litigation risks, auditor size, and the severity (i.e., the number of weakness in various 
categories) and the nature of the weakness. This allows us to determine whether an 
increase in audit fees is due to the uniform increase of the fees for all the firms with 
the WIC or the increase in differential magnitude for the clients with various risk 
levels, auditors, and characteristics of weakness.  
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
  The passage of the SOX resulted in substantial changes in the duties and 
responsibilities of the auditors of public companies. Specifically, Section 404 
significantly altered the overall scope and quality of audit by requiring an integrated 
audit of the financial statements and the internal control systems from 2004. 
Accordingly, anecdotal evidence to date indicates that the audit fees paid by SEC 
registrants increased substantially after the passage of SOX.4
                                                 
4 For example, Financial Executives International indicated in its Jan. 2004 survey an increase in audit 
fees for the company in the survey of $591,000 due to Section 404 compliance, an increase of 38% 
over pre-Section 404 levels, which was later updated in its July 2004 survey to $823,200, or an 
increase of 92.5% over pre-Section 404 levels. 
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The audit fee determinants literature dates back to Simunic (1980). His model 
of audit pricing specifies audit fees as a function of the expected costs of conducting 
the audit including a normal profit margin plus the expected costs of their business 
(litigation) risk. Formally, his model can be denoted as: 
E(tc) = cq + E(d)* E(r)       (1) 
where E(tc) is total expected cost to the auditor or the audit fees; c is per unit 
cost of external auditor resources; q is quantity of resources used by the auditor in 
performing the audit examination; E(d) is expected present value of possible future 
losses due to undetected material misstatements in this period; E(r) is expected 
likelihood that the auditor will be liable from future litigation associated with 
undetected material misstatements in this period.  This model has been widely used in 
audit research to examine whether auditors price litigation costs as well as their effort 
costs when they set audit fees, and the such studies mostly find positive relationships 
between litigation risk and audit fees.5    
On the other hand, the audit risk model described in SAS #47 states that 
overall audit risk of the auditor is determined as follows: 
AR = IR * CR * DR        (2) 
where AR is audit risk; IR is inherent risk (the risk that material misstatements 
will occur, assuming no related internal controls); CR is control risk (the risk that 
material misstatements will not be prevented or detected by the internal controls); DR 
is detection risk (the risk that the auditor will not detect a material misstatements).  
Traditionally, auditors perform the test of control to examine whether the 
internal control system in the client firm has been properly designed to prevent or 
detect material misstatements. If auditors conclude that the control risk is high, 
                                                 
5 Please refer to Pratt and Stice (1994), Simunic and Stein (1996), Seetharaman et al. (2002), and Lyon 
and Maher (2005). 
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auditing standards require auditors to perform additional substantive audit tests, and 
such additional tests may increase the auditor’s effort costs (i.e., the first component 
in Eq.(1), cq).  Moreover, the audit firm may use an engagement team with more 
industry-specific experience if any WIC in complex situations requires a high level of 
audit knowledge and experience in detecting misstatements (Johnstone and Bedard 
2003), and such audit team may charge higher billing rates to the clients. In those 
cases, the first component in Eq.(1), cq, will go up.  Alternatively, the high control 
risk may motivate auditors to charge an insurance premium to cover possible future 
losses associated with undetected misstatements (Bell, Landsman, and Shackelford 
2001).6  Prior research on audit fees has demonstrated that audit fees are sensitive to 
conditions that increase an auditor’s risk. 7   If an auditor is to earn risk-adjusted 
returns on an engagement, a greater audit risk due to the WIC should result in a higher 
risk premium charge. Taking together, we propose the following hypothesis in 
alternative form: 
H1: Other thing equal, there is a positive association between material 
weakness in internal control and audit fees. 
 
Seetharaman et al. (2002) show that auditors of UK firms charge higher fees 
for their services when their clients are cross-listed on the U.S. market. They argue 
that the auditor’s assessment of the litigation risk is influenced by the general legal 
environment where the client operates as well as other client-specific factors. The 
enactment of SOX and other accompanying accounting and auditing regulations 
resulted in a non-trivial shift in the legal environment in the U.S.8  With similar 
                                                 
6 Charging an insurance premium may also be combined with additional substantive tests. 
7 Using an experimental design, Houston et al. (1999) find that the presence of accounting choices 
reflecting higher risks of accounting irregularities, leads to higher litigation risk assessments and fee 
premiums. 
8 For example, by Title VIII, “Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002”, Auditors are 
required to maintain all audit or review work papers for five years. Title IX, “White Collar Crime 
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arguments to Seetharaman et al., one can reasonably posit that auditors’ assessment of 
E(d) and E(r) will shift upward (i.e., higher litigation loss assessment) around or 
following the passage of the SOX, leading to an increase in audit fees.9  Moreover, 
the increase in audit fees as a result of the change in the litigation environment may be 
greater for the clients with the WIC because in order to avoid the higher expected 
legal liability loss, the auditors of such clients may have to provide more extensive 
substantive tests and/or alternatively charge a higher insurance premium after the 
passage of the SOX. Thus, we propose the second hypothesis as: 
H2: Other thing equal, the positive association between material weakness 
in internal control and audit fees is stronger after the passage of the 
SOX. 
 
An auditor’s assessment of E(d) and E(r) may vary across the clients 
depending on the level of the client litigation risk because of the fact that a portion of 
such risk is borne by the auditor. Specifically, Palmrose (1997) shows that auditor 
litigation often occurs when the client is financially distressed. Although it is difficult 
to predict financial failure of the client, researchers often use profitability, leverage, 
and presence of net losses, among others, to proxy for the litigation risk of the clients. 
One can posit that an auditor’s assessment of E(d) and E(r) will be higher when the 
clients are exposed to a higher litigation risk. In such case, for clients with the WIC, 
the auditors may have to increase the level of substantive testing or charge a higher 
fee premium to compensate for their higher expected future litigation loss, leading to 
an audit fee increase.  Similarly to H2, we predict that the higher audit fee for the 
clients with weak internal control combined with a high litigation risk will be more 
                                                                                                                                            
Penalty Enhancements” increased the maximum criminal penalty for mail and wire fraud from 5 to 10 
years. 
9 In addition, additional audit effort required to attest to the effectiveness of the client’s internal control 
system will be another possible reason for the audit fee increase. 
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prominent in the post-SOX period in which auditors’ overall legal responsibility and 
liability is higher. This leads to: 
H3: Other thing equal, the positive association between material weakness 
in internal control and audit fees is stronger for the clients with higher 
litigation risk. The stronger association is greater after the passage of 
the SOX. 
 
Another consequence of audit failure is the auditor’s reputation loss. When 
auditors’ reputation is impaired, they incur revenue losses resulting from a difficulty 
to attract new clients and to retain existing clients as well as reduced audit fees (e.g., 
Firth 1990). Prior research shows that auditors with superior reputation, namely the 
Big 4 auditors, charge higher fees (e.g., Craswell et al. 1995), enjoying the rent on 
their superior reputation (e.g., Herbig and Milewicz 1995). Accordingly, it is more 
important for the Big 4 auditors than other auditors to protect their positive reputation 
when clients likely damage their reputation. Consequently, in the presence of WIC, 
the Big 4 auditors may perform a higher level of substantive tests to protect their 
brand name reputation and/or charge a higher premium. Moreover, the Big 4 auditors 
are more likely sued and suffer larger damage awards because of their perceived 
“deeper pockets,” so litigations are more costly for them (e.g., Khurana and Raman 
2004). This leads us to propose the following hypothesis: 
H4: Other thing equal, the positive association between material weakness 
in internal control and audit fees is stronger for firms audited by Big 4 
auditors. The stronger association is greater after the passage of the 
SOX. 
 
 
It is possible that the effect of material weaknesses of internal control on audit 
fees may vary with the nature of material weaknesses. Moody’s proposes that material 
weaknesses fall into one of two categories. Type “A” material weaknesses relate to 
controls over specific account balances or transaction-level processes. Moody’s 
suggests that these types of material weaknesses are “auditable,” and thus do not 
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represent as serious a concern regarding the reliability of the financial statements. 
Type “B” material weaknesses, however, relate to company-level controls such as the 
control environment or the overall financial reporting process, which auditors may not 
be able to effectively “audit around.” Moody’s suggests that Type B material 
weaknesses call into question not only management’s ability to prepare accurate 
financial reports but also its ability to control the business.  
For Type A, despite material weaknesses, we expect that auditors may take 
corrective actions with additional work in the audit procedures because such control 
problems appear to be specific, localized and correctable within a short period.  On 
the other hand, company-level control problems would be difficult to “audit around,” 
and more serious financial reporting problems would be related to them.  We predict 
that company-level weaknesses in internal control will have higher audit fees as this 
type of material weakness may severely affect auditors’ potential legal losses. 
 
H5: Other thing equal, the positive association between material weakness 
in internal control and audit fees is stronger when the nature of 
material weakness is related to firm-level controls. The stronger 
association is greater after the passage of the SOX. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Empirical model 
 Building upon the results of prior studies (Chaney et al., 2004; Choi et al., 
2005; Craswell et al., 1995; DeFond et al., 2002; Francis and Stokes, 1986; Frankel et 
al., 2002; Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant, 2003; Simunic, 1980; Simunic and 
Stein, 1996), we posit the following audit fee model to test our Hypotheses 1 and 2:  
       AFEE = α0 + α1 IC + α2 (IC * YR0304) + β1 LEVE + β2 LOSS + β3 ROA  
+ β4 BIG4 + γ1 LNTA + γ2 NBS + γ3 NGS + γ4 EMPLOY                           (1) 
+ γ5 INVREC + γ6 ISSUE  + γ7 BTM + γ8 FOREIGN + γ9 EXORD  
+ γ10 AUDCHG  + γ11 LAMDA  + industry and year dummies + error term 
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where, for client firm j and in year t:  
AFEE = natural log of fees paid to auditors for their financial statement 
audits (i.e., audit fees) in thousand dollars;  
 
IC = Either IC_D or IC_C; IC_D = 1 if the client receive internal 
control weakness opinion from auditor, 0 otherwise; IC_C = 
natural log of one plus the number of categories that the clients 
receive internal control weakness opinion; 
 
YR0304 = 1 if the fiscal year is 2003 or 2004, 0 otherwise; 
 
LEVE = leverage (total liabilities divided by total assets), windsorized 
at 5; 
 
LOSS  = 1 if the firm reported a loss during the year, 0 otherwise; 
 
ROA  = return on assets (income before extraordinary items divided by 
average total assets); 
 
BIG4 = 1 if the auditor is one of Big 4, 0 otherwise; 
 
LNTA = natural log of total assets in thousand dollars; 
 
NBS = natural log of one plus number of business segments; 
 
NGS = natural log of one plus number of geographic segments; 
 
EMPLOY = square root of the number of employees; 
 
INVREC  = inventory and receivables divided by total assets;  
 
ISSUE = 1 if the sum of debt or equity issued during the past 3 years are 
more  than 5% of the total assets, 0 otherwise; 
 
BTM = book-to-market ratio, windsorized at 0 and 4; 
 
FOREIGN = 1 if the firm pays any foreign income tax, 0 otherwise; 
 
EXORD = 1 if the firm reports any extraordinary gains or losses, 0 
otherwise; 
 
      RNDTA = research and development expenditure (Compustat data item 
number 46) divided by total assets; 
 
AUDCHG = 1 if the incumbent auditor is different from the last year’s 
auditor, 0 otherwise; 
 
RAMDA = inverse Mills ratio for endogenuity to receive internal control 
weakness opinion. 
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 In the above, all independent variables are measured as of the end of fiscal 
year unless otherwise noted. The variables, LNTA and EMPLOY, are used as proxies 
for client size, while the variable, NBS, NGS, INVREC, FOREIGN, EXORD, and 
RNDTA as proxies for the scope and complexity of a client firm’s business. The 
demand for audit services is likely to increase with firm size (LNTA and EMPLOY) 
and the extent of business diversification (NBS and NGS). We expect that audit fees 
are positively associated with these variables. Audit fees are likely to be higher for 
clients with more complex business operations. We therefore expect that the variables 
representing client complexity, INVREC, FOREIGN, EXORD, and RNDTA are 
positively associated with audit fees. In short, all coefficients on the aforementioned 
variables are expected to be positive.  
We also include AUDCHG to represent the low-balling of new auditors 
(Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant 2003). Thus, a negative sign is expected for the 
AUDCHG. We include ISSUE and BTM to capture the effect of a client firm’s growth 
potential on audit fees. Growing firms are more often involved in external financing 
such as equity and bond offerings. The demand for both audit and non-audit services 
is greater for high-growth firms than low-growth firms. In addition, firms involved in 
equity and debt offerings are in a greater need of audit services (Reynolds et al. 2004). 
We therefore expect a positive (negative) coefficient on ISSUE (BTM).  
It is possible that the clients firms receive internal control weakness opinions 
(ICWO) from auditors are essentially different from the others (Ashbaugh et al. 2005; 
Doyle et al. 2005). To control this endogeneity problem, we first run probit ICWO 
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model and calculate the inverse Mills ratio. We include the inverse Mills ratio 
(LAMDA) in Eq. (1) to control for the problem.10
 In Eq. (1), we also include LOSS, LEVE, and ROA, to proxy for a client’s risk 
characteristics. Since auditors charge higher fees for risky clients (Simunic and Stein 
1996), the coefficients on LOSS and LEVE are predicted to be positive while that on 
ROA is negative. We include BIG4 to capture the effect of audit quality differentiation 
on audit fees. A positive coefficient on BIG4 means the existence of fee premiums for 
the superior quality, prestigious auditors, namely Big 4 (previously 8, 6, or 5).  
 Our variable of interest is IC and the interaction between IC and YR0304. We 
measure IC in two different ways. The first measure (IC_D) is a dummy variable that 
has a value of 1 if the client firm receive ICWO at fiscal year 2004, and 0 otherwise. 
The second measure (IC_C) is a continuous variable that has a value of the natural log 
of one plus the number of categories that the client firm receives ICWO from auditor 
at the same time. Thus, if the firm that receive ICWO pay higher audit fees as 
suggested by Hypothesis 1, the coefficient of the IC would be positive. In addition, if 
there exist any fee increases for those firms after year 2002 as suggested by 
Hypothesis 2, the coefficient of the interaction term between IC and YR0304 would be 
positive too.  
 To examine Hypotheses 3 and 4, we use the following model: 
                                                 
10 Following Ashbaugh et al. (2005) and Doyle et al. (2005), we run the following first stage model. 
          IC_D = a + β1 LNTA + β2 GROWTH + β3 INVTA + β4 LOSS + β5 ROA + β6 NBS  
+ β7 NGS + β8  FOREIGN + β9  MA + β10  RESTRUCT + β11  BIG4 + β12  AUDCHG  
+ β13  OWNERSHIP + β14 LITIG_IND + error terms 
where, GROWTH is the assets growth from year t-1 to year t scaled by the assets of year t-1; INVTA is 
inventory divided by total assets, MA is merger and acquisition dummy that has a value of 1 if the firm 
has any merger and acquisition activity in the year, and 0 otherwise; RESTRUCT is dummy variable if 
the firm’s restructuring cost is higher than 1 percent of the sales; OWNERSHIP is a measure of 
ownership concentration (1- [1,000 * (# of shareholders / # of outstanding shares)]); LITIG_IND is the 
litigious industry dummy variable. The definitions of other variables are the same as before. We also 
repeat the tests (i) after removing insignificant independent variables, and (ii) after removing the 
variables that are already included in Eq. (1), but the results are always similar.  
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       AFEE = α0 + α1 IC + α2 (IC * YR0304)  
+ β1 LEVE + β2 (LEVE * IC) +β3  (LEVE * IC * YR0304)  
+ β4 LOSS + β5 (LOSS * IC) + β6 (LOSS * IC * YR0304)  
+ β7 ROA + β8 (ROA * IC) + β9 (ROA * IC * YR0304)                    (2) 
+ β10 BIG4  + β11 (BIG4 * IC) + β12 (BIG4 * IC * YR0304)  
+ γ1 LNTA + γ2 NBS + γ3 NGS + γ4 EMPLOY + γ5 INVREC + γ6 ISSUE  
+ γ7 BTM + γ8 FOREIGN + γ9 EXORD + γ10 AUDCHG + γ11 LAMDA   
+ industry and year dummies + error term 
 
 Compared with Eq. (1), we add the interaction terms with IC and three firm-
specific risk variables (LEVE, LOSS, and ROA) as well as Big 4 auditor indicator 
variable (BIG4). In addition, we add three-way interactions among IC, the four 
variables (LEVE, LOSS, ROA, and BIG4) and a year 2003 and 2004 dummy variable 
(YR0304).11 Thus, as predicted by Hypothesis 3, if auditors charge higher fees even 
before the enforcement of the SOX for risky firms that receive the ICWO in year 
2004, the interaction terms between IC and risk variables would be positive. 
Additionally, if the auditor starts to charge even higher fees after year 2002, the three 
three-way interactions terms would be positive too.12 Similarly, the interaction term 
between IC and BIG4 would be positive if Big 4 auditors charge higher fees for the 
clients that receive the ICWO as predicted by Hypothesis 4 and the three-way 
interaction between IC, BIG4, and YR0304 would be positive if the Big 4 auditors fee 
premium for the firms with WIC changes more from year 2003. 
 To examine Hypothesis 5, we use the following model. 
       AFEE = α0 + α1 IC + α2 (IC * TYPEA) + α3 (IC * YR0304)  
+ α4 (IC * YR0304 * TYPEA) + β1 LEVE + β2 (LEVE * IC)  
+ β3 (LEVE * IC * TYPEA) +β4  (LEVE * IC * YR0304)  
+ β5  (LEVE * IC * YR0304 * TYPEA) + β6 LOSS + β7 (LOSS * IC)  
                                                 
11 We choose year 2003 as the cutoff year to make the dummy variable YR0304. Even though the SOX 
was enforced from November 2002, the year-by-year analyses reveal that there exist clear coefficients 
differences between the period until 2002 and the period after year 2002. The results of year 2002 is 
more similar to those of year 2000 or 2001 in the year-by-year analyses than those of year 2003 or 
2004. Thus, we select year 2003 as the cut-off year. This result suggests that it took about 1 year for the 
SOX to change the pricing mechanism of the auditors. 
12 For empirical analyses, we also perform tests without yearly dummy variables because the variables 
could have strong multi-collinearity with YR0304 variable. Without the dummies, our documented 
relationships become stronger but all the inferences remain the same. 
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+ β8 (LOSS * IC * TYPEA) + β9 (LOSS * IC * YR0304) 
+ β10 (LOSS * IC * YR0304 * TYPEA) + β11 ROA + β12 (ROA * IC)            (3) 
+ β13 (ROA * IC * TYPEA) + β14 (ROA * IC * YR0304) 
+ β15 (ROA * IC * YR0304 * TYPEA) + β16 BIG4 + β17 (BIG4 * IC) 
+ β18 (BIG4 * IC * TYPEA)+ β19 (BIG4 * IC * YR0304)  
+ β20 (BIG4 * IC * YR0304 * TYPEA) + γ1 LNTA + γ2 NBS + γ3 NGS  
+ γ4 EMPLOY + γ5 INVREC + γ6 ISSUE + γ7 BTM + γ8 FOREIGN  
+ γ9 EXORD + γ10 AUDCHG + γ11 LAMDA   
+ industry and year dummies + error term 
 
 Compared with Eq. (2), the above Eq. (3) has interactions between TYPEA 
variable and all the other variables of interests.  The TYPEA variable has a value of 1 
if the WIC belongs to type A and 0 otherwise. Thus, if the audit fee effect of type A 
weakness is different from the others, at least one of the interaction term would be 
significantly different from zero. 
 
4.2 Sample and data sources 
 We obtain audit (and non-audit) fee data from the 2005 Audit Analytics 
database. We retrieve all the other financial data from the 2005 Compustat Industrial 
annual file. The sample period for this study is restricted to the four-year period from 
2000 to 2004 because the Audit Analytics includes audit fee data starting from 2000,13 
and the current version of the database includes the data only up to fiscal year 2004. 
We exclude the data from financial industry because the audit fee structure of the 
firms belong to the industry could be very different from firms belong to other 
industries. 
 The data on the auditor’s opinion on internal control weakness of the clients 
are hand-collected via the search of 10-K reports filed to SEC. We search for EDGAR 
database of SEC to find the all the sample firms that the fiscal year-end finishes 
                                                 
13  The SEC’s Final Rule S7-13-00 (Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence 
Requirements) requires registrants to disclose information about fees paid to the auditor in proxy 
statements filed on and after February 5, 2001.   
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between November 2004 and February 2005 (inclusive). Section 404 became 
effective for annual reports covering periods that starting 2004 fiscal year. We also 
search for PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), which began collecting internal control 
reports from all SEC filings in 2005, not only those reported in 10-K filings. PwC 
grouped each of the material weaknesses into one of 22 categories. 
As a result, we find a total of 232 firms that receive the internal control 
weakness opinion in our sample, which is about 10.27% out of total sample. The total 
sample size is 9,087 firm-year observations. The sample include 1,058 firm-year 
observations from 232 firms that received ICWO during the period, and other 8,029 
firm-year observations that received non-ICWO during the same period.  
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. With 
respect to the results presented in Table 1, the following are noteworthy: First, the 
average AFEE (natural log of audit fees in thousand dollars) during our sample period 
is 6.0176 which is translated into $ 410,592. We will further discuss on the audit fee 
changes and differential fees between the clients firms that receive ICWO and the 
other firms in Table 4. Second, we measure the ICWO in two different ways; a 
dummy variable (IC_D) and a continuous variable (IC_C). We will further discuss on 
the ICWO in Table 2. Finally, the distributional properties of other variables are, 
overall, comparable with those reported in other recent audit fee related studies (e.g., 
Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Choi et al., 2005). Note that LEVE (ROA) 
are windsorized at 5 (–5) [about extremely large (small) 1%] in order to remove the 
influence of a few extreme outliers. Similarly, the BTM is also windsorized at 0 and 4. 
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When we perform tests to examine if there exist any statistical differences in these 
control variables between firms that receive ICWO and the others, we find many of 
the differences are significant. It implies that, as pointed out by Ashbaugh et al. 
(2005) and Doyle et al. (2005), the firms that receive ICWO are essentially different 
firms from the other firms that do not receive ICWO. To control for this endogeneity 
problem, we include inverse Mills ratio for the ICWO in the regression model using 
two stage procedures.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE!] 
 
5.2 Statistics on weakness in internal control 
 Table 2 reports the statistics on WIC. The Panel A of Table 2 reports the 
number of firms and firm-year observations that receive or do not receive ICWO from 
auditors. A total of 2,454 firms are included in our dataset as reported in the bottom-
left row of the table. Among them, 89.73% of firms do not receive ICWO and the 
remaining 10.27% of the firms receive ICWO. Similarly, among 9,087 firm-year 
observations from year 2000 to 2004 as reported in the bottom-right row of the table, 
88.36% of the observations do not receive ICWO and the remaining 11.64% of the 
observations receive the opinion. Panel A also reports the number of the categories of 
WIC that the client firms receive from auditors. For example, 28 client firms (121 
observations) receive the opinion from auditors that only one WIC exists for the firm, 
whereas 6 clients firms (25 observations) receive the opinion that the firms have 10 
weaknesses in the internal control system. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the category of ICWO. We collect a total of 26 
different kinds of WIC categories mentioned in the audit report. Among them, the 
most frequent weakness is related to ‘application of GAAP and accounting policies’, 
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which occupies 32.61% among the entire ICWO.14 The closest second weakness is 
related to ‘review of transactions’ which is about 32.42% out of total ICWO. Because 
some of the weakness rarely occurs, we separately demonstrate the frequency for 15 
different categories in Panel B and combine all the other 11 categories to ‘others.’ 
About 31.47% of the WIC belong to the ‘others’ category. Because the firms that 
receive ICWO in multiple categories may pay higher audit fee premiums, we use both 
the dummy variable IC_C and continuous variable IC_D to examine the effect of the 
multiple weaknesses. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE!] 
 
5.3 Pairwise correlation among research variables 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for our research variables that are 
included in Eq. (1). For our measures of ICWO (IC_D and IC_C), they are highly 
correlated with each other (ρ = 0.946), and they are also significantly correlated with 
audit fees (AFEE).  With respect to the structure of correlation among our explanatory 
variables, the following are noteworthy: First, there firm-specific risk variables 
(LEVE, LOSS and ROA) are highly correlated with each other, suggesting that risky 
firms in one dimension is likely to perform poorly in other dimensions too. Second, 
firm size (LNTA) is highly correlated three risk variables, suggesting that large firms 
are less likely to suffer financial risks. Third, none of the control variables are highly 
correlated with our two tests variables (IC_D and IC_C). Other variables that are 
highly correlated with firm-specific risk measures are RNDTA and LAMDA. Because 
                                                 
14 The sum of the percentage (%) in Panel B of Table 2 is greater than 100 percent because many client 
firms receive ICWO in multiple categories as reported in Panel A of Table 2. 
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LAMDA is highly correlated with many other variables – especially with BIG4, LNTA, 
and NGS, we repeat empirical analyses with or without the variable.15
 [INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE!] 
 
5.4 Univariate analyses on audit fee changes for post-SOX period 
 We compare the audit fees across our sample period. The Panel A of Table 4 
reports average audit fees for our total samples, for the samples that have WIC (IC_D 
= 1), and for the sample that have no WIC (IC_D = 0). Although it is not tabulated, 
the results show that the sample firms that have WIC pay higher audit fees every 
years during our sample period, compared with other firms. For example, in year 2000, 
the average audit fees for total sample is 5.5856 ($266,560). The firms having WIC 
pay the average fee of 5.6283 ($278,189), whereas the firms having no such problem 
pay the average fee of 5.5846 ($266,294). 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE!] 
 To examine the effect of the SOX on audit fees, we examine the change of 
audit fees from year 2002 to year 2003. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 4. 
For a proper comparison, we only use the samples that included in our dataset for both 
year 2002 and 2003. The results in Panel B of Table 4 reveal that the average 
(median) audit fees of the firms that have WIC increase by 0.3335 or 7.76% (0.2571 
or 4.34%) during the period. At the same time, the average (median) fee of the firms 
that have no WIC increases by 0.2458 or 5.67% (0.1942 or 3.14%). The differences 
between the two are significant as reported in the bottom two rows of Panel B. These 
                                                 
15 In performing regression analyses, we also measure the VIF values to examine potential multi-
collineraity problems. But none of the VIF values are high enough to cause the problem. Thus, we do 
not separately report the values in the paper. We also drop all the control variables or one of the control 
variables that highly correlated with other control variable (one by one) and perform regression 
analyses with variables of interest, but the results are qualitatively similar. 
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results represent that the audit fees of the firms with WIC increase more during the 
period than those of the firms with no WIC.  
 In Panel C of Table 4, we report the average or median fee changes from year 
2001 and 2002 to year 2003 and 2004. We again use only the continuous sample 
during the period for a proper comparison. The change of ratio is calculated by using 
the audit fees of year 2001 as the base value. Again, the results consistently suggest 
that the audit fee increase more for the firms that have WIC than for the firms that 
have no such weakness. 
 
5.5 Analyses on the determinants of audit fees 
 With Eq. (1), we perform various regression analyses to examine the effect of 
WIC problems on audit fees. The empirical results are reported in Table 5. Reported t-
values in the Table are on an adjusted basis using White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-
consistent covariance matrix.16 Note that models 1 and 2 do not include any variables 
of interests, to show the normal relationship between control variables and audit fees. 
Models 3 through 10 include the IC variable and models 4, 6, 8, and 10 have 
interactions with IC and YR0304 dummy variable. The models 3 through 6 use the 
dummy variable for the measurement of WIC (IC_D), whereas models 7 through 10 
use the continuous variable for the measurement of WIC (IC_C). Finally, models 2, 5, 
6, 9, and 10 include the LAMDA (inverse Mills ratio) while the other models do not. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE!] 
 The results in models 1 and 2 show that every control variables have 
significant coefficients in the expected directions, except BTM. Because we already 
                                                 
16 We repeat all the regression tests performed in this study by calculating clustered standard error by 
each client firm. Because most of the results are qualitatively identical, we do not report them 
separately, except an exceptional case when the result is different. 
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discuss the expected directions of these control variables in previous section, we do 
not explain the results on them in this part. The explanatory power of the model 1 is 
81.18%, which suggest very high ability of the control variables to explain the 
variations in the audit fees.  
When we add IC variable in the model as in model 3, the coefficient of the 
variable is 0.0993 (t = 5.19), suggesting a significantly higher fees for the firms that 
receive ICWO.17 When we scan the results in models 3 through 10, the coefficients of 
IC variable are significant only when the interaction term between IC and YR0304 is 
not added to the model, while the interaction between IC and YR0304 are always 
significant. In short, the results suggest that client firms with WIC start to pay higher 
audit fees from year 2003, while there is no significant fee difference in audit fees for 
the clients between with WIC and with no-WIC before year 2003.18  
 To examine the economic significance of the results, we set every variables 
except IC in their sample means and calculate average audit fees. The results in model 
3 are translated into average audit fees of $335,510 for firms with no WIC, whereas 
firms with WIC pay $35,026 (1.71% in terms of logged value or 10.44% in terms of 
actual dollar value) more audit fees than the firms without WIC. This result suggests 
that WIC is economically important determinants of the audit fees as well. 
 
5.6 Analyses on the interactions among firm-specific risks and auditor choice, 
and internal control weakness opinions 
 Although the documented results in Table 5 show that the firms with WIC pay 
higher audit fees, it is not clear if auditors charge fixed amount of higher fee for every 
                                                 
17 The model 3 of Table 5 is comparable to the test performed by Hogan and Wilkins (2005), except 
that we include more control variables and use longer time period data. 
18 When we perform analyses with individual category of material weakness mentioned in Panel B of 
Table 2, we find that segregation of duties and property/equipment/lease are not significantly related to 
audit fees, while all the other categories are significantly associated with audit fees with positive signs.  
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firms with WIC or the magnitude of the fee increase is related to financial risks of the 
client firms. Thus, we use Eq. (2) and re-perform regression analyses. The empirical 
results are reported in Table 6. Note that models 1 through 4 use IC_D while models 5 
through 8 use IC_C as a proxy for WIC. The models 1, 3, 5, and 7 in Table 6 have 
two-way interaction terms between firm-specific risk variables (LEVE, LOSS, and 
ROA) as well as Big 4 auditor indicator variable (BIG4) and IC variable, while models 
2, 4, 6, and 8 have additional three-way interaction terms between two-way 
interaction terms and YR0304 to examine if the relationship changes from year 2003. 
Models 3, 4, 7, and 8 include LAMDA as an additional control variable while the other 
models do not.  
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE!] 
 In Table 6, the coefficients of IC variable are mostly not significant, suggest 
that audit fees do not uniformly increase before 2003 for the firms with WIC. The 
interaction between IC and YR0304 yield mixed results. In models 2 and 4, the 
interaction term is positively significant. However, the interaction term is not 
significant in models 6 and 8. The sum of α1 and  α2 is not different from zero in both 
models 2 and 4. Thus, the evidence of the fixed audit fee premiums and the changes 
of the premiums from 2003 for the firms with WIC are not clear in the above results. 
 For the leverage of the firms (LEVE), it is highly associated with the audit fees, 
as suggested by significant coefficients across all the models. The coefficient (β2) of 
the interaction terms between LEVE and IC is also significantly positive in all models, 
suggesting that highly levered firms with WIC pay higher fees even before year 2003. 
However, the coefficient (β3) of the three-way interaction term of (LEVE * IC * 
YR0304) is marginally smaller than zero in models 2, 4, 6, and 8. The marginally 
significant results become insignificant when we use the clustered standard error by 
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each client firm. For example, in model 2 (4) the t value of the β3 becomes –1.50 (-
1.64) when we use the clustered standard error. These results support the argument 
that there is no fee change with respect to leverage for the firms with WIC during the 
post-SOX period. 
 For LOSS variable, the coefficient of LOSS itself is significant with positive 
sign, implying that loss-making firms pay higher audit fees. The coefficient of two-
way interaction term between LOSS and IC is not significant. However that of the 
three-way interaction term (LOSS * IC * YR0304) is marginally insignificant in 
models 2 and 4, but marginally significant in models 6 and 8. The results suggest that 
loss-making firms with multiple weaknesses start to pay marginally higher fee from 
year 2003. This finding is the evidence that auditor change the fee structure to 
compensate for the increased risk related to loss-making firms from the passage of 
SOX. 
 For ROA variable, we find that the coefficient of ROA itself is significant 
across different models but the coefficients of two-way or three-way interactions are 
not, suggesting that ROA does not have significantly change the fee structure with 
respect to the firms with WIC. 
 With respect to BIG4, we find that the coefficient of the variable itself is 
significantly positive across models. However, the coefficient of the two-way 
interaction is significant in models 2 and 4, but not in models 6 and 8. The results on 
three-way interactions are not significant too. Although they are not significant, in 
models 6 and 8, the sum of the coefficients of the two-way and the three-way 
interactions (β11 + β12) are significantly different from zero in model 6 (F = 3.61 with 
p = 0.0575) and in model 8 (F = 3.80 with p = 0.0512). Thus, based on the above 
findings, it seems that the clients of Big 4 auditors with WIC pay higher audit fees 
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than the clients of non-Big 4 auditors with WIC, although it is not clear when the 
clients start to pay higher audit fees. 
 For control variables, as before, all the coefficients are significant in the 
expected direction except BTM. Thus, we do not repeat the discussion on them for the 
simplicity purpose. 
 In terms of the economic significance of the results, the results in model 2 are 
translated into the audit fee premium of $108,857 (4.74%) from year 2003 for average 
firms in our dataset with WIC, compared with average firms without the weakness.19 
For loss-making firms with WIC, the audit fees increase by 5.51% from year 2003, 
while it is only 4.20% for profit-making firms with WIC. For highly levered firms 
(LEVE = 1) with WIC, the audit fees increase by 5.91% on average from 2003, while 
it is only 3.61% for lowly levered firms (LEVE = 0.1) with WIC. For the clients of 
Big 4 auditors, the premium for the clients with WIC increase by 4.93% on average 
from 2003, whereas the premium increases by 3.17% for the clients of non-Big 4 
auditors with WIC.  
It may possible that the significant correlations among four variables of 
interest (LEVE, LOSS, ROA, and BIG4) as reported in Table 3 may cause insignificant 
results in some of the variables in Table 7. To examine this possibility, we run 
regression with only one variable of interest and two-way and three-way interactions 
with IC and YR0304 variable after excluding all the variables that include any other 
variables of interest. For example, we examine the LEVE with the following Eq. (4), 
which exclude all the variables contain LOSS, ROA, and BIG4.  
        AFEE = α0 + α1 IC + α2 (IC * YR0304) + β1 LEVE + β2 (LEVE * IC)  
+β3  (LEVE * IC * YR0304) + γ1 LNTA + γ2 NBS + γ3 NGS + γ4 EMPLOY  
+ γ5 INVREC + γ6 ISSUE + γ7 BTM + γ8 FOREIGN + γ9 EXORD               (4) 
                                                 
19 The percentage increase is calculated from logged value of the audit fees. When we calculate the 
percentage increase by actual dollar value, the increase is 31.85%. 
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+ γ10 AUDCHG + γ11 LAMDA + industry and year dummies + error term 
 
In this case, the coefficient of (LEVE * IC * YR0304) is not significantly 
different from zero in every models while the coefficient of (LEVE * IC) is significant 
at 1% level. For example, the β2 is 0.2997 (t = 3.87), the β3 is –0.0929 (t = -0.90), 
and the sum of β2 and β3 is greater than zero (F = 7.77 with p = 0.0053). The results 
suggest that highly-levered clients with WIC started to pay higher audit fees even 
before 2003 and continue to pay throughout post-SOX period, which is consistent 
with the findings in Table 6. 
Similarly, we examine LOSS variable with the following Eq. (5).  
        AFEE = α0 + α1 IC + α2 (IC * YR0304) + β1 LOSS + β2 (LOSS * IC)  
+β3  (LOSS * IC * YR0304) + γ1 LNTA + γ2 NBS + γ3 NGS + γ4 EMPLOY  
+ γ5 INVREC + γ6 ISSUE + γ7 BTM + γ8 FOREIGN + γ9 EXORD               (5) 
+ γ10 AUDCHG + γ11 LAMDA + industry and year dummies + error term 
 
When the LOSS is examined, the sum of the coefficients of (LOSS * IC) and 
(LOSS * IC * YR0304) become significantly positive at 5% level. For example, the β2 
is 0.0306 (t = 0.60), the β3 is 0.0858 (t = 1.16), and the sum of β2 and β3 is greater 
than zero (F = 4.13 with p = 0.0413).20 The results suggest that loss-making clients 
with WIC pay higher audit fee premiums only in post-SOX period, confirming the 
findings in models 6 and 8 of Table 6. When we examine ROA and BIG4, the results 
are not qualitatively different from those in Table 6. Thus, we do not separately report 
them for the simplicity purpose.  
 
5.7 Analyses on the different effects of ‘TYPE A’ vs. ‘TYPE B’ weakness  
                                                 
20 When we use clustered standard error by each firm, the sum of the coefficients are significant at 10% 
level (F = 3.43 with p = 0.0642). 
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 The Hypothesis 5 predicts that the fee effect of type A weakness would be 
different from that of type B weakness. To examine this prediction, we use Eq. (3) for 
our analyses. The results using Eq. (3) are reported in Table 7. As reported in Tables 5 
and 6, because the results using IC_D and IC_C are qualitatively similar, we report 
only the results using IC_D for the simplicity purpose. The models 1 and 2 in Table 7 
have two-way interaction terms between firm-specific risk variables (LEVE, LOSS, 
and ROA) as well as Big 4 auditor indicator variable (BIG4) and IC variable, while 
models 3 and 4 have the three-way interaction terms between two-way interaction 
terms and YR0304 as well as the two-way interaction terms to examine if the 
relationship changes from year 2003. These two-way and three-way interaction term 
all have also interaction variables with IC_D, thus become three-way and four-way 
interactions. Models 2 and 4 include LAMDA as an additional control variable while 
the other models do not.  
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE!] 
The results in Table 7 clearly show that all the results reported in Table 6 are 
consistent even when we use the Eq. (3). For example, the coefficients of (IC * 
YR0304), (LEVE * IC), (LOSS * IC * YR0304), and (BIG4 * IC * YR0304) variables 
are significant. The coefficients of these variables are all significant in Table 6 too. 
However, any variables that contain TYPEA are far from significance, suggesting that 
there are no differential audit fee effects for type A versus type B weakness. This 
finding is similar to that of Hammersley et al. (2005). They also fail to find any significant 
differences in the market’ reaction to the announcements of different types of WIC. These 
findings suggest that both auditors and investors focus on the existence of WIC itself rather 
than the exact reason of the WIC. 
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6. Sensitivity Analyses 
 
 We perform various sensitivity analyses to re-confirm the findings in this 
study. First, we perform analyses without 2002 data because the effect of SOX is not 
clear in the year if the law significantly influence the audit fee-setting mechanism 
right away. However, all the empirical results are qualitatively similar in that the 
coefficients of LOSS and BIG4 are significant in the three-way interactions while the 
coefficient of LEVE is significant in the two-way interaction. In contrast, if we change 
cutoff year to year 2002 rather than 2003 and treat year 2002 like year 2003 and 
2004’s data, the results change slightly with respect to BIG4 variable, while the 
results on LOSS and LEVE are qualitatively similar as before. When IC_D is used, the 
coefficient of neither (BIG4 * IC) nor (BIG4 * IC * YR0304) is significant and the 
sum of the coefficients of the two are not different from zero (F = 2.07 with p = 
0.1499). However, when IC_C is used, the coefficient of three-way interaction for the 
BIG4 becomes significant (β12 = 0.2386 with t=2.07 in model 6 of Table 6) while it 
was insignificant in Table 6.  
Second, SOX specifically mentions that a company that is not required to file 
annual and quarterly reports on an accelerated basis (i.e., a U.S. company with market 
capitalization below $75 million) comply with the SOX 404 requirements for its first 
fiscal year ending on or after July 15, 2007. Thus, we report our tests after removing 
all the firms belong to this category because they are not required to report any WIC. 
However, auditors for some of the clients belong to this category voluntarily report 
the WIC for the client firms. Thus, we expand our samples into all the firms 
regardless of the firm size. When we perform the tests with 12,403 observations of the 
expanded sample, the results are slightly different with respect to the threw-way 
interaction for BIG4 variable which becomes insignificant. However, because we do 
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not sure if some of these additional 3,316 observations have no WIC or auditors do 
not report the weakness voluntarily, we are not able to make any conclusions for this 
different result. 
 Third, we perform the tests with only continuous sample from year 2001 to 
2004 or from year 2000 to 2004. The results are almost identical and thus not 
tabulated for the simplicity purpose. 
 Fourth, we perform tests without yearly dummies because yearly dummies 
could cause multicolinearity with YR0304 variable. However, with or without the 
yearly dummies do not change the documented results. 
 Fifth, we use non-audit fees or total fees (the sum of audit and non-audit fees) 
as dependent variables rather than audit fees to examine if non-audit service fees can 
be affected by WIC. We find that among two-way interaction variables, only the 
coefficients of (LOSS * IC) and (BIG4 * IC) are positive and significant. Among 
three-way interactions, only the coefficient of (BIG4 * IC * YR0304) is negative and 
significant. For example, the coefficient (t value) of [LOSS * IC], [BIG4 * IC], and 
[BIG4 * IC * YR0304] is 0.1997 (1.90), 1.0672 (3.60), and –0.8323 (-2.15), 
respectively in model 2 when non-audit fees are used as a dependent variable. The 
sum of the coefficients of (LOSS * IC) and (LOSS * IC * YR0304) as well as the sum 
of the coefficients of (BIG4 * IC) and (BIG4 * IC * YR0304) are all not different from 
zero. The results suggest that auditors with loss-making clients with WIC and/or Big 4 
auditors that audit clients with WIC perform more non-audit service and/or charger 
higher non-audit service fees for the client firms in pre-SOX period. However, this 
tendency disappears from year 2003, suggesting that non-audit service fees for clients 
with WIC are not different from those for clients with no-WIC at post-SOX period. 
Given the regulatory concerns that the provision of non-audit service could impair 
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auditor independence, these results suggest that auditors increase auditor 
independence from year 2003 when they audit the clients with WIC, or clients with 
WIC was upset due to the ICWO by auditors and decrease the non-audit service that 
they receive from the auditor. 
 Finally, to examine the comparability of our sample with the sample in used in 
prior studies, we replicate the study of Hogan and Wilkins (2005). Consistent with 
their findings, we find that performance-matched discretionary accruals (Kasznik 
1999 or Kothari et al. 2005) are not significantly related to the internal control 
weakness problems.  When our sample firms with WIC are matched to non-WIC 
firms in the same industry (2-digit SIC code) and the same year which have the 
closest return on assets, there was no significant differences in terms of the level of 
absolute discretionary accruals both in a univairate test and a multivariate test. These 
results suggest that the characteristics of our dataset are not different from those used 
in prior studies.   
 
7. Conclusions 
 The SOX requires the implementation of many new rules and procedures. One 
element of SOX, concentrated in Sections 302 and 404, relates to the internal control 
over financial reporting. Essentially, SOX requires top management to establish, 
maintain, and regularly evaluate the effectiveness of internal control over financial 
reporting and auditors express their opinion on the quality of the internal control 
system of the client firms. 
We identify 232 companies that have disclosed at least one material weakness 
in internal control in their SEC filings from November 2004 to August 2005 in 
response to the Section 404 requirements of SOX. Using these dataset, we examine 
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the association between audit fees and material weaknesses in internal control system 
of the client firms.  
Our empirical results reveal that the firms with WIC tend to pay higher audit 
fees compared with the firms without WIC. The highly-levered firms with WIC tend 
to pay higher fees even pre-SOX period while the loss-making firms with WIC starts 
to pay higher fees from 2003. There is evidence that the clients of Big 4 auditors with 
WIC also pay higher audit fees, but it is not clear if they start to pay the higher fees 
from year 2003 or earlier than the year.  
These results suggest that auditors either work more or charge higher risk 
premiums to compensate for the greater litigation risk for the clients with WIC. The 
results on the interactions between client-specific risk with WIC (IC variable in the 
regression models) suggest that the audit fee increase for the clients with WIC is not 
uniform increase for all the clients with WIC but the differential increase based on the 
client-specific risks.  
In summary, the findings in this study provide important insight into the 
behaviour of auditors in response to strengthened legal environments and their pricing 
mechanism. 
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Table 1 
Distributions of variables 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1% 50% 99% 
AFEE 6.0176 1.2815 3.0445 5.9271 9.2003 
IC_D 0.1164 0.3208 0 0 1 
IC_C 0.2499 0.4504 0.0953 0.0953 2.0919 
LEVE 0.5357 0.4809 0.0451 0.4801 2.7199 
LOSS 0.4040 0.4907 0 0 1 
ROA -0.1057 0.4984 -2.1647 0.0239 0.3136 
BIG4 0.8875 0.3160 0 1 1 
LNTA 12.7503 2.0498 7.0121 12.7269 17.2799 
NBS 1.0022 0.4826 0 0.6931 2.0794 
NGS 0.9818 0.6318 0 1.0986 2.3026 
EMPLOY 64.4305 76.5601 2 38.7814 370.1351 
INVREC 0.2393 0.1823 0 0.2113 0.7629 
ISSUE 0.4875 0.4999 0 0 1 
BTM 0.5674 0.6145 0 0.4074 4 
FOREIGN 0.4762 0.4995 0 0 1 
EXORD 0.2298 0.4207 0 0 1 
RNDTA 0.0681 0.1425 0 0.0038 1 
AUDCHG 0.0868 0.2816 0 0 1 
LAMDA 1.7880 0.2395 1.3793 1.7601 2.6212 
 
Definitions of Variables 
AFEE           = natural log of audit fees;  
IC_D            = 1 if the auditor of the client firm received internal control weakness opinion, 0 otherwise;  
IC_C            = the log of one plus the number of internal control weakness categories that the client firm  
received. 
LEVE            = leverage (total liabilities divided by total assets); 
LOSS            = 1 if the firm reported a loss during the year, 0 otherwise; 
ROA             = return on assets; 
BIG4             = 1 if the auditor is a Big 4 or predecessor auditor, 0 otherwise; 
LNTA            = log value of total assets;  
NBS              = log value of one plus number of business segments; 
NGS              = log value of one plus number of geographic segments; 
EMPLOY      = square root of the number of employees; 
INVREC       = inventory and receivables divided by total assets;  
ISSUE           = 1 if the sum of debt or equity issued during the past 3 years are more than 5% of the total  
                          assets, 0 otherwise; 
BTM         = book-to-market ratio, windsorized at 0 and 4; 
FOREIGN     = 1 if the firm pays any foreign income tax, 0 otherwise; 
EXORD         = 1 if the firm reports any extraordinary gains or losses, 0 otherwise; 
ROA              = return on assets; 
RNDTA       = research and development expenditure divided by total assets; 
AUDCHG     = 1 if auditor is in the first year of audit engagement, 0 otherwise; 
LAMDA       = inverse Mills ratio for the receipt of endogenous weak internal control opinion. 
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Table 2 
Statistics on weakness in internal control  
 
Panel A: Number of internal control weakness opinions 
 
Firms Firm-year observations Number of 
weakness in 
internal control  
Number % Number % 
0 2,202 89.73 8,029 88.36 
1 28 1.14 121 1.33 
2 73 2.97 311 3.42 
3 48 1.96 209 2.30 
4 43 1.75 178 1.96 
5 20 0.82 76 0.84 
6 17 0.69 65 0.72 
7 9 0.37 41 0.45 
8 3 0.12 11 0.12 
9 5 0.20 21 0.23 
10 6 0.24 25 0.28 
Total 2,454 100.00 9,087 100.00 
 
 
 
Panel B: Categorization of the weakness in internal control  
 
 
Category Number of 
observations 
% 
Application of GAAP/ accounting policies 345 32.61 
Review of transactions 343 32.42 
Tax-related issues 319 30.15 
Staffing issues (levels, training, or expertise) 293 27.69 
Property, equipment, lease 277 26.18 
Policies / documentation issues 241 22.78 
Financial statement closing process/ controls 233 22.02 
Control environments 198 18.71 
International operations / subsidiaries 172 16.26 
IT & applications 138 13.04 
Merger/acquisition-related issues 136 12.85 
Inventory management 113 10.68 
Revenue / billing 101 9.55 
Segregation of duties 93 8.79 
Employee benefit / pension 74 6.99 
Others 333 31.47 
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Table 3  
Pearson correlations among variables 
 
Variable AFEE IC_D IC_C LEVE LOSS ROA BIG4 LNTA NBS NGS EMP-
LOY 
INV-
REC 
ISSUE BTM FOR-
EIGN 
EXORD RNDTA AUD-
CHG 
IC_D 0.059 
(<0.001) 
                 
IC_C 0.065 
(<0.001) 
0.946 
(<0.001) 
                
LEVE 0.027 
(0.011) 
-0.022 
(0.033) 
-0.021 
(0.047) 
               
LOSS -0.234 
(<0.001) 
0.035 
(0.033) 
0.047 
(0.760) 
0.120 
(<0.001) 
              
ROA 0.312 
(<0.001) 
0.032 
(0.003) 
0.014 
(0.177) 
-0.441 
(<0.001) 
-0.440 
(<0.001) 
             
BIG4 0.367 
(<0.001) 
0.039 
(<0.001) 
0.0933 
(0.002) 
-0.193 
(<0.001) 
-0.131 
(<0.001) 
0.298 
(<0.001) 
            
LNTA 0.801 
(<0.001) 
0.030 
(0.004) 
0.024 
(0.025) 
-0.093 
(<0.001) 
-0.338 
(<0.001) 
0.476 
(<0.001) 
0.453 
(<0.001) 
           
NBS 0.229 
(<0.001) 
0.029 
(0.006) 
0.031 
(0.004) 
0.029 
(0.006) 
-0.098 
(<0.001) 
0.118 
(<0.001) 
0.059 
(<0.001) 
0.218 
(<0.001) 
          
NGS 0.409 
(<0.001) 
0.060 
(<0.001) 
0.076 
(<0.001) 
-0.045 
(<0.001) 
-0.142 
(<0.001) 
0.228 
(<0.001) 
0.162 
(<0.001) 
0.338 
(<0.001) 
0.120 
(<0.001) 
         
EMP-
LOY 
0.594 
(<0.001) 
-0.008 
(0.470) 
-0.019 
(0.073) 
0.072 
(<0.001) 
-0.260 
(<0.001) 
0.210 
(<0.001) 
0.200 
(<0.001) 
0.683 
(<0.001) 
0.141 
(<0.001) 
0.189 
(<0.001) 
        
INVREC 0.029 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.811) 
-0.002 
(0.883) 
0.079 
(<0.001) 
-0.229 
(<0.001) 
0.157 
(<0.001) 
-0.071 
(<0.001) 
-0.039 
(<0.001) 
0.074 
(<0.001) 
0.148 
(<0.001) 
0.083 
(<0.001) 
       
ISSUE -0.044 
(<0.001) 
-0.012 
(0.245) 
-0.015 
(0.160) 
0.123 
(<0.001) 
0.126 
(<0.001) 
-0.158 
(<0.001) 
-0.047 
(<0.001) 
-0.054 
(<0.001) 
-0.033 
(0.002) 
-0.111 
(<0.001) 
-0.068 
(<0.001) 
-0.110 
(<0.001) 
      
BTM -0.063 
(<0.001) 
0.020 
(0.059) 
0.022 
(0.037) 
-0.128 
(<0.001) 
0.058 
(<0.001) 
0.088 
(<0.001) 
0.021 
(0.049) 
0.028 
(0.009) 
0.069 
(<0.001) 
0.006 
(0.588) 
-0.012 
(0.239) 
0.126 
(<0.001) 
-0.111 
(<0.001) 
     
FOR-
EIGN 
0.483 
(<0.001) 
0.055 
(<0.001) 
0.066 
(<0.001) 
-0.034 
(0.001) 
-0.210 
(<0.001) 
0.228 
(<0.001) 
0.183 
(<0.001) 
0.407 
(<0.001) 
0.139 
(<0.001) 
0.595 
(<0.001) 
0.270 
(<0.001) 
0.156 
(<0.001) 
-0.119 
(<0.001) 
-0.022 
(0.035) 
    
EXORD 0.223 
(<0.001) 
0.024 
(<0.025) 
0.027 
(0.009) 
0.122 
(<0.001) 
0.035 
(<0.001) 
0.047 
(<0.001) 
0.052 
(<0.001) 
0.215 
(<0.001) 
0.136 
(<0.001) 
0.072 
(<0.001) 
0.172 
(<0.001) 
-0.025 
(0.016) 
0.017 
(0.099) 
0.073 
(<0.001) 
0.082 
(<0.001) 
   
RNDTA -0.252 
(<0.001) 
-0.040 
(<0.001) 
-0.024 
(0.023) 
0.031 
(0.003) 
0.365 
(<0.001) 
-0.488 
(<0.001) 
-0.078 
(<0.001) 
-0.389 
(<0.001) 
-0.168 
(<0.001) 
-0.166 
(<0.001) 
-0.250 
(<0.001) 
-0.216 
(<0.001) 
0.117 
(<0.001) 
-0.179 
(<0.001) 
-0.164 
(<0.001) 
-0.120 
(<0.001) 
  
AUD-
CHG 
-0.104 
(<0.001) 
0.023 
(0.047) 
0.020 
(0.052) 
0.043 
(<0.001) 
0.049 
(<0.001) 
-0.042 
(<0.001) 
-0.155 
(<0.001) 
-0.090 
(<0.001) 
-0.012 
(0.251) 
-0.019 
(0.071) 
-0.065 
(<0.001) 
0.006 
(0.599) 
-0.012 
(0.275) 
0.040 
(<0.001) 
-0.045 
(<0.001) 
0.017 
(0.098) 
0.007 
(0.495) 
 
LAMDA 
 
-0.609 
(<0.001) 
-0.093 
(<0.001) 
-0.093 
(<0.001) 
0.358 
(<0.001) 
0.020 
(0.056) 
-0.472 
(<0.001) 
-0.650 
(<0.001) 
-0.725 
(<0.001) 
-0.219 
(<0.001) 
-0.473 
(<0.001) 
-0.387 
(<0.001) 
0.014 
(0.168) 
0.055 
(<0.001) 
-0.085 
(<0.001) 
-0.519 
(<0.001) 
-0.130 
(<0.001) 
0.225 
(<0.001) 
-0.020 
(0.058) 
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Table 4 
Audit fee difference between pre-SOX and post-SOX period 
 
 
Panel A: Year-by-year mean audit fees for total sample 
 
Year 
 
N Total sample IC_D = 1 IC_D = 0 
2000 
 
1,626 5.5856 5.6283 5.5846 
2001 
 
1,741 5.6573 5.7235 5.6365 
2002 
 
1,875 5.8119 5.9542 5.7759 
2003 
 
1,952 6.0614 6.2968 6.0076 
2004 
 
1,893 6.8785 7.1018 6.7679 
 
 
Panel B: Audit fee changes from year 2002 to year 2003 for continuous sample 
 
 N 
 
 Amount  Ratio (%) 
Mean 
 
0.3335 7.76 IC_D = 1 228 
Median 
 
0.2571 4.34 
Mean 
 
0.2458 5.67 IC_D = 0 1,697 
Median 
 
0.1942 3.14 
t value 
 
2.40*** 1.52* Difference 
z value 
 
2.64*** 3.08*** 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
 
Panel C: Average audit fee changes from year 2001 and 2002 to year 2003 and 
2004 for continuous sample 
 
 N 
 
 Amount  Ratio (%) 
Mean 
 
0.9408 17.70 IC_D = 1 215 
Median 
 
0.9571 16.76 
Mean 
 
0.6988 12.49 IC_D = 0 1,378 
Median 
 
0.6943 12.02 
t value 
 
7.47*** 7.35*** Difference 
z value 
 
4.59*** 6.47*** 
 
Amount represents the change of the log value of audit fees (in thousand of dollars) and ratio represents the 
change of the log value of audit fee scaled by the log value of the audit fee at the start of the period.  *, **, 
and *** denote p-value<10%, p-value<5%, and p-value<1%, respectively with one-tailed tests.  
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Table 5 
OLS Regression analyses on determinants of audit fees 
 
       AFEE = α0 + α1 IC + α2 (IC * YR0304) + β1 LEVE + β2 LOSS + β3 ROA + β4 BIG4 + γ1 LNTA + γ2 NBS + γ3 NGS + γ4 EMPLOY + γ5 INVREC  
+ γ6 ISSUE  + γ7 BTM + γ8 FOREIGN + γ9 EXORD + γ10 AUDCHG  + γ11 LAMDA  + industry and year dummies + error term 
 
  Without WIC IC = IC_D 
 
IC = IC_C 
Variables Predicted 
sign 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
Model 7 
 
Model 8 
 
Model 9 
 
Model 10 
IC +   0.0993 
(5.19***) 
-0.0208 
(-0.84) 
0.1035 
(5.42***) 
-0.0164 
(-0.66) 
0.0844 
(6.11***) 
-0.0032 
(-0.18) 
0.0876 
(6.36***) 
-0.0000 
(-0.00) 
IC * 
YR0304 
?    0.2763 
(7.41***) 
 0.2756 
(7.40***) 
 0.1997 
(7.43***) 
 0.1997 
(7.44***) 
LEVE + 0.1982 
(10.26***) 
0.1582 
(7.26***) 
0.1992 
(10.33***) 
0.1982 
(10.33***) 
0.1564 
(7.19***) 
0.1557 
(7.19***) 
0.1998 
(10.36***) 
0.1987 
(10.37**) 
0.1562 
(7.18***) 
0.1551 
(7.17***) 
LOSS + 0.1529 
(10.49***) 
0.2079 
(10.22***) 
0.1485 
(10.22***) 
0.1473 
(10.18***) 
0.2073 
(10.20***) 
0.2057 
(10.17**) 
0.1475 
(10.16***) 
0.1461 
(10.11***) 
0.2074 
(10.22***) 
0.2060 
(10.19***) 
ROA - -0.0707 
(-2.99***) 
-0.0591 
(-2.48**) 
-0.0714 
(-3.02***) 
-0.0743 
(-3.16***) 
-0.0590 
(-2.48**) 
-0.0620 
(-2.62**) 
-0.0700 
(-2.96***) 
-0.0738 
(-3.14***) 
-0.0573 
(-2.41**) 
-0.0611 
(-2.58***) 
BIG4 + 0.2530 
(9.91***) 
0.3455 
(9.63***) 
0.2504 
(9.77***) 
0.2516 
(9.89***) 
0.3494 
(9.76***) 
0.3499 
(9.84***) 
0.2508 
(9.80***) 
0.2520 
(9.92***) 
0.3516 
(9.83***) 
0.3529 
(9.93***) 
LNTA + 0.4139 
(65.26***) 
0.4338 
(54.43***) 
0.4139 
(65.24***) 
0.4148 
(65.64***) 
0.4352 
(54.55***) 
0.4359 
(54.82**) 
0.4135 
(65.15***) 
0.4146 
(65.60***) 
0.4352 
(54.57***) 
0.4362 
(54.86***) 
NBS + 0.1137 
(8.97***) 
0.1289 
(9.62***) 
0.1119 
(8.88***) 
0.1113 
(8.86***) 
0.1282 
(9.62***) 
0.1274 
(9.59***) 
0.1115 
(8.86***) 
0.1112 
(8.87***) 
0.1280 
(9.62***) 
0.1277 
(9.64***) 
NGS + 0.1420 
(11.29***) 
0.1602 
(11.73***) 
0.1397 
(11.13***) 
0.1391 
(11.13***) 
0.1591 
(11.69***) 
0.1584 
(11.69***) 
0.1385 
(11.05***) 
0.1382 
(11.09***) 
0.1582 
(11.64***) 
0.1580 
(11.69***) 
EMPLOY + 0.0018 
(12.00***) 
0.0017 
(11.61***) 
0.0018 
(12.11***) 
0.0018 
(12.07***) 
0.0018 
(11.70***) 
0.0017 
(11.66***) 
0.0018 
(12.17***) 
0.0018 
(12.12**) 
0.0018 
(11.75***) 
0.0018 
(11.70***) 
INVREC + 0.5468 
(12.99***) 
0.5836 
(13.50***) 
0.5495 
(13.04***) 
0.5496 
(13.10***) 
0.5891 
(13.61***) 
0.5889 
(13.67***) 
0.5480 
(13.02***) 
0.5485 
(13.09***) 
0.5882 
(13.61***) 
0.5887 
(13.68***) 
ISSUE + 0.0239 
(1.96**) 
0.0307 
(2.51**) 
0.0238 
(1.96**) 
0.0239 
(1.97*) 
0.0311 
(2.54**) 
0.0310 
(2.55**) 
0.0242 
(1.99**) 
0.0237 
(1.95**) 
0.0316 
(2.59***) 
0.0311 
(2.55**) 
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BTM - -0.0109 
(-1.06) 
-0.0121 
(-1.17) 
-0.0109 
(-1.05) 
-0.0115 
(-1.12) 
-0.0122 
(-1.17) 
-0.0128 
(-1.24) 
-0.0112 
(-1.08) 
-0.0117 
(-1.14) 
-0.0125 
(-1.21) 
-0.0130 
(-1.27) 
FOREIGN + 0.2584 
(16.31***) 
0.2948 
(16.04***) 
0.2545 
(16.04***) 
0.2528 
(16.01***) 
0.2934 
(15.97***) 
0.2914 
(15.94***) 
0.2538 
(16.03***) 
0.2519 
(15.98***) 
0.2933 
(15.99***) 
0.2914 
(15.96***) 
EXORD + 0.1694 
(11.46***) 
0.1670 
(11.30***) 
0.1684 
(11.41***) 
0.1679 
(11.41***) 
0.1658 
(11.24***) 
0.1653 
(11.24***) 
0.1677 
(11.37***) 
0.1671 
(11.35***) 
0.1650 
(11.19***) 
0.1643 
(11.17***) 
RNDTA + 0.4634 
(7.70***) 
0.4495 
(7.42***) 
0.4677 
(7.77***) 
0.4655 
(7.77***) 
0.4528 
(7.47***) 
0.4508 
(7.48***) 
0.4674 
(7.77***) 
0.4663 
(7.79***) 
0.4523 
(7.47***) 
0.4512 
(7.49***) 
AUDCHG - -0.1091 
(-4.10***) 
-0.0719 
(-2.53**) 
-0.1119 
(-4.21***) 
-0.1150 
(-4.34***) 
-0.0722 
(-2.54**) 
-0.0756 
(-2.67***) 
-0.1122 
(-4.22***) 
-0.1148 
(-4.33***) 
-0.0717 
(-2.53**) 
-0.0743 
(-2.63***) 
LAMDA ?  0.3352 
(3.85***) 
  0.3596 
(4.13***) 
0.3569 
(4.12***) 
  0.3660 
(4.21***) 
0.3661 
(4.23***) 
Intercept ? 0.5558 
(7.54***) 
-0.4376 
(-1.64) 
0.5498 
(7.46***) 
0.5231 
(7.12***) 
-0.5162 
(-1.94*) 
-0.5349 
(-2.01**) 
0.5448 
(7.39***) 
0.5055 
(6.87***) 
-0.5405 
(-2.03**) 
-0.5801 
(-2.18**) 
Industry 
dummies 
 Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year 
 dummies 
 Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N  9,087 9,087 9,087 9,087 9,087 9,087 9,087 9,087 9,087 9,087 
Adjusted R2  0.8118 0.8121 0.8123 0.8134 0.8127 0.8138 0.8126 0.8138 0.8130 0.8142 
 
 
All t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using White’s (1980) consistent standard error estimates to correct for heteroskedasticity.  *, **, and *** denotes p-value<10%, p-
value<5%, and p-value<1%, respectively with two-tailed tests. IC_D: 1 if the company receives internal control weakness opinion in fiscal year 2004 and 0 otherwise. IC_C: log 1.1 
plus the number of internal control weakness categories included in audit opinion of fiscal year 2004. YR0304: 1 if the fiscal year is 2003 or 2004 and 0 otherwise. See Table 1 for the 
definitions of other variables.  
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Table 6 
OLS Regression analyses on interactions with firm-specific risks and internal control weakness 
 
       AFEE = α0 + α1 IC + α2 (IC * YR0304) + β1 LEVE + β2 (LEVE * IC) +β3  (LEVE * IC *YR0304) + β4 LOSS + β5 (LOSS * IC)  
+ β6 (LOSS *IC * YR0304) + β7 ROA + β8 (ROA * IC) + β9 (ROA * IC * YR0304) + β10 BIG4  + β11 (BIG4 * IC) + β12 (BIG4 * IC * YR0304)  
+ γ1 LNTA + γ2 NBS + γ3 NGS + γ4 EMPLOY + γ5 INVREC + γ6 ISSUE + γ7 BTM + γ8 FOREIGN + γ9 EXORD + γ10 AUDCHG + γ11 LAMDA  
+ industry and year dummies + error term 
 
  IC = IC_D 
 
IC = IC_C 
Variables Predicted  
Sign 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
Model 7 
 
Model 8 
 
IC + -0.1244 
(-1.19) 
-0.4418 
(-2.39**) 
-0.1205 
(-1.15) 
-0.4484 
(-2.43**) 
-0.0436 
(-0.60) 
-0.1633 
(-1.31) 
-0.0413 
(-0.57) 
-0.1688 
(-1.36) 
IC * YR0304 +  0.4812 
(2.27**) 
 0.4983 
(2.35**) 
 0.1754 
(1.26) 
 0.1868 
(1.34) 
LEVE + 0.1841 
(9.33***) 
0.1839 
(9.36***) 
0.1396 
(6.28***) 
0.1385 
(6.25***) 
0.1696 
(8.03***) 
0.1702 
(8.15***) 
0.1240 
(5.27***) 
0.1242 
(5.33***) 
LEVE * IC + 0.2669 
(4.57***) 
0.3358 
(4.19***) 
0.2730 
(4.68***) 
0.3483 
(4.35***) 
0.1715 
(3.92***) 
0.2139 
(3.72***) 
0.1761 
(4.03***) 
0.2222 
(3.85***) 
LEVE * IC * 
YR0304 
+  -0.1785 
(-1.69*) 
 -0.1929 
(-1.82*) 
 -0.1325 
(-1.81*) 
 -0.1409 
(-1.82*) 
LOSS + 0.1413 
(9.24***) 
0.1370 
(8.97***) 
0.2018 
(9.68***) 
0.1989 
(9.56***) 
0.1387 
(8.48***) 
0.1327 
(8.12***) 
0.2001 
(9.25***) 
0.1948 
(9.04***) 
LOSS * IC + 0.0073 
(0.17) 
-0.0441 
(-0.83) 
0.0074 
(0.17) 
-0.0471 
(-0.90) 
0.0172 
(0.57) 
0.0002 
(0.01) 
0.0176 
(0.59) 
-0.0019 
(-0.05) 
LOSS * IC * 
YR0304 
+  0.1273 
(1.50) 
 0.1319 
(1.56) 
 0.0991 
(1.71*) 
 0.1026 
(1.77*) 
ROA - -0.0730 
(-3.00***) 
-0.0735 
(-3.04***) 
-0.0603 
(-2.45**) 
-0.0605 
(-2.48**) 
-0.0734 
(-2.88***) 
-0.0786 
(-3.14***) 
-0.0603 
(-2.34**) 
-0.0650 
(-2.58***) 
ROA * IC - -0.0454 
(-0.62) 
-0.0820 
(-0.99) 
-0.0473 
(-0.65) 
-0.0835 
(-1.02) 
-0.0016 
(-0.04) 
-0.0298 
(-0.73) 
-0.0025 
(-0.07) 
-0.0310 
(-0.76) 
ROA * IC * 
YR0304 
-  -0.1182 
(-0.65) 
 -0.1284 
(-0.70) 
 0.1336 
(1.03) 
 0.1273 
(0.98) 
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BIG4 + 0.2442 
(9.50***) 
0.2390 
(9.35***) 
0.3468 
(9.62***) 
0.3438 
(9.58***) 
0.2444 
(8.86***) 
0.2347 
(8.51***) 
0.3488 
(9.30***) 
0.3397 
(9.11***) 
BIG4 * IC + 0.0900 
(0.91) 
0.2808 
(2.67***) 
0.0869 
(0.88) 
0.2875 
(2.73***) 
0.0361 
(0.53) 
0.0494 
(0.69) 
0.0344 
(0.51) 
0.0552 
(0.77) 
BIG4 * IC * 
YR0304 
+  -0.1703 
(-0.85) 
 -0.1843 
(-0.92) 
 0.0696 
(0.80) 
 0.0597 
(0.69) 
LNTA + 0.4122 
(64.86***) 
0.4135 
(65.29***) 
0.4341 
(54.47**) 
0.4358 
(54.79***) 
0.4121 
(64.88**) 
0.4135 
(65.33***) 
0.4343 
(54.54**) 
0.4359 
(54.88***) 
NBS + 0.1126 
(8.92***) 
0.1129 
(8.99***) 
0.1294 
(9.71***) 
0.1300 
(9.80***) 
0.1120 
(8.89***) 
0.1124 
(8.96***) 
0.1290 
(9.69***) 
0.1296 
(9.79***) 
NGS 
 
+ 0.1389 
(11.08***) 
0.1387 
(11.11***) 
0.1589 
(11.69***) 
0.1591 
(11.77***) 
0.1377 
(11.00***) 
0.1380 
(11.10**) 
0.1580 
(11.64***) 
0.1585 
(11.77***) 
EMPLOY + 0.0018 
(12.11***) 
0.0018 
(12.04**) 
0.0018 
(11.68***) 
0.0017 
(11.61***) 
0.0018 
(12.17***) 
0.0018 
(12.11**) 
0.0018 
(11.74**) 
0.0017 
(11.68***) 
INVREC + 0.5424 
(12.87***) 
0.5433 
(12.96***) 
0.5830 
(13.48***) 
0.5848 
(13.59***) 
0.5430 
(12.91***) 
0.5419 
(12.96***) 
0.5842 
(13.53***) 
0.5836 
(13.60***) 
ISSUE + 0.0225 
(1.85*) 
0.0229 
(1.89*) 
0.0299 
(2.45**) 
0.0305 
(2.51**) 
0.0232 
(1.91*) 
0.0233 
(1.93*) 
0.0307 
(2.52**) 
0.0310 
(2.55**) 
BTM - -0.0106 
(-1.02) 
-0.0104 
(-1.01) 
-0.0118 
(-1.15) 
-0.0117 
(-1.14) 
-0.0109 
(-1.05) 
-0.0108 
(-1.05) 
-0.0123 
(-1.18) 
-0.0120 
(-1.17) 
FOREIGN + 0.2546 
(16.04***) 
0.2522 
(15.97***) 
0.2947 
(16.03***) 
0.2932 
(16.01***) 
0.2535 
(16.00***) 
0.2509 
(15.94***) 
0.2943 
(16.03***) 
0.2920 
(15.99***) 
EXORD + 0.1668 
(11.30***) 
0.1661 
(11.27***) 
0.1641 
(11.12***) 
0.1633 
(11.09***) 
0.1667 
(11.30***) 
0.1658 
(11.23***) 
0.1639 
(11.11***) 
0.1629 
(11.04***) 
RNDTA 
 
+ 0.4597 
(7.67***) 
0.4613 
(7.75***) 
0.4440 
(7.36***) 
0.4454 
(7.43***) 
0.4591 
(7.67***) 
0.4523 
(7.67***) 
0.4432 
(7.35***) 
0.4364 
(7.35***) 
AUDCHG 
 
- -0.1112 
(-4.16***) 
-0.1140 
(-4.30***) 
-0.0702 
(-2.46**) 
-0.0723 
(-2.55**) 
-0.1117 
(-4.18***) 
-0.1121 
(-4.22***) 
-0.0701 
(-2.46**) 
-0.0702 
(-2.48**) 
LAMDA ?  
 
 0.3711 
(4.27***) 
0.3791 
(4.37***) 
  0.3771 
(4.34***) 
0.3806 
(4.39***) 
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Intercept ? 0.5930 
(8.00***) 
0.5664 
(7.67***) 
-0.5063 
(-1.90*) 
-0.5567 
(-2.09**) 
0.5928 
(7.91***) 
0.5604 
(7.50***) 
-0.5241 
(-1.97**) 
-0.5669 
(-2.13**) 
Industry 
dummies 
 Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year 
 Dummies 
 Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N  9,087 9,087 9,087 9,087 9,087 9,087 9,087 9,087 
Adjusted R2  0.8128 0.8142 0.8132 0.8146 0.8130 0.8144 0.8134 0.8148 
 
All t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using White’s (1980) consistent standard error estimates to correct for heteroskedasticity.  *, **, and *** denotes p-value<10%, p-
value<5%, and p-value<1%, respectively with two-tailed tests. IC_D: 1 if the company receives internal control weakness opinion in fiscal year 2004 and 0 otherwise. IC_C: log 1.1 
plus the number of internal control weakness categories included in audit opinion of fiscal year 2004. YR0304: 1 if the fiscal year is 2003 or 2004 and 0 otherwise. See Table 1 for the 
definitions of other variables.  
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Table 7 
The effect of ‘TYPE A’ weakness in internal control on audit fees 
 
       AFEE = α0 + α1 IC + α2 (IC*TYPEA) + α3 (IC*YR0304) + α4 (IC*YR0304*TYPEA)  
+ β1 LEVE + β2 (LEVE*IC) + β3 (LEVE*IC*TYPEA) +β4  (LEVE*IC*YR0304)  
+ β5  (LEVE*IC*YR0304*TYPEA) + β6 LOSS + β7 (LOSS*IC)  
+ β8 (LOSS*IC*TYPEA) + β9 (LOSS*IC*YR0304)+ β10 (LOSS*IC*YR0304*TYPEA)  
+ β11 ROA + β12 (ROA*IC) + β13 (ROA*IC*TYPEA) + β14 (ROA*IC*YR0304) 
+ β15 (ROA*IC*YR0304*TYPEA) + β16 BIG4  + β17 (BIG4*IC) 
+ β18 (BIG4*IC*TYPEA)+ β19 (BIG4*IC*YR0304)  
+ β20 (BIG4*IC*YR0304*TYPEA) + γ1 LNTA + γ2 NBS + γ3 NGS + γ4 EMPLOY  
+ γ5 INVREC + γ6 ISSUE + γ7 BTM + γ8 FOREIGN + γ9 EXORD + γ10 AUDCHG  
+ γ11 LAMDA  + industry and year dummies + error term 
 
 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
IC_D -0.1398 
(-1.14) 
-0.1449 
(-1.17) 
-0.1048 
(-0.88) 
-0.1108 
(-0.93) 
IC_D*TYPEA 0.0700 
(0.34) 
0.0873 
(0.43) 
0.0042 
(0.02) 
0.0201 
(0.09) 
IC_D*YR0304  
 
 -0.2462 
(-3.67***) 
-0.2439 
(-3.65***) 
IC_D*YR0304*TYPEA  
 
 0.1291 
(1.25) 
0.1299 
(1.26) 
LEVE 0.1841 
(9.33***) 
0.1380 
(6.21***) 
0.1831 
(9.32***) 
0.1373 
(6.20***) 
LEVE*IC_D 0.2972 
(3.93***) 
0.3091 
(4.10***) 
0.2607 
(2.83***) 
0.2773 
(3.00***) 
LEVE*IC_D*TYPEA -0.1019 
(-0.92) 
-0.1168 
(-1.06) 
-0.0225 
(-0.15) 
-0.0409 
(-0.28) 
LEVE*IC_D*YR0304  
 
 0.0074 
(0.06) 
-0.0056 
(-0.04) 
LEVE*IC_D*YR0304*TYPEA  
 
 -0.0714 
(-0.32) 
-0.0576 
(-0.26) 
LOSS 0.1416 
(9.26***) 
0.2043 
(9.79***) 
0.1368 
(8.95***) 
0.1991 
(9.56***) 
LOSS*IC_D 0.0283 
(0.46) 
0.0299 
(0.48) 
-0.0463 
(-0.61) 
-0.0505 
(-0.67) 
LOSS*IC_D*TYPEA -0.0470 
(-0.53) 
-0.4660 
(-0.53) 
-0.0361 
(-0.34) 
-0.0295 
(-0.28) 
LOSS*IC_D*YR0304  
 
 0.2551 
(2.10**) 
0.2697 
(2.23**) 
LOSS*IC_D*TY0304*TYPEA  
 
 -0.1465 
(-0.86) 
-0.1676 
(-0.99) 
ROA -0.0727 
(-2.98***) 
-0.0595 
(-2.42**) 
-0.0735 
(-3.04***) 
-0.0604 
(-2.48**) 
ROA*IC_D 0.0318 
(0.22) 
0.0499 
(0.35) 
-0.0906 
(-0.54) 
-0.0772 
(-0.47) 
ROA*IC_D*TYPEA -0.0860 
(-0.52) 
-0.1089 
(-0.67) 
0.0335 
(0.18) 
0.0175 
(0.09) 
ROA*IC_D*YR0304  
 
 0.2277 
(0.64) 
0.2453 
(0.70) 
ROA*IC_D*YR0304*TYPEA  
 
 -0.5745 
(-1.42) 
-0.6206 
(-1.54) 
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BIG4 0.2444 
(9.51***) 
0.3507 
(9.73***) 
0.2405 
(9.41***) 
0.3460 
(9.64***) 
BIG4*IC_D 0.0381 
(0.31) 
0.0389 
(0.32) 
-0.0645 
(-0.53) 
-0.0609 
(-0.50) 
BIG4*IC_D*TYPEA 0.1151 
(0.61) 
0.1101 
(0.59) 
0.1477 
(0.68) 
0.1413 
(0.65) 
BIG4*IC_D*YR0304  
 
 0.3001 
(3.37***) 
0.2959 
(3.33***) 
BIG4*IC_D*YR0304*TYPEA  
 
 0.0011 
(0.01) 
0.0055 
(0.04) 
LNTA 0.4122 
(64.83***) 
0.4349 
(54.40***) 
0.4133 
(65.22***) 
0.4359 
(54.68***) 
NBS 0.1116 
(8.85***) 
0.1288 
(9.68***) 
0.1114 
(8.87***) 
0.1285 
(9.69***) 
NGS 0.1385 
(11.04***) 
0.1592 
(11.70***) 
0.1377 
(11.02***) 
0.1583 
(11.69***) 
EMPLOY 0.0018 
(12.10***) 
0.0018 
(11.66***) 
0.0018 
(12.03***) 
0.0017 
(11.59***) 
INVREC 0.5405 
(12.81***) 
0.5826 
(13.45***) 
0.5404 
(12.89***) 
0.5823 
(13.52***) 
ISSUE 0.0224 
(1.84*) 
0.0301 
(2.47**) 
0.0230 
(1.90*) 
0.0306 
(2.52**) 
BTM -0.0120 
(-1.15) 
-0.0134 
(-1.29) 
-0.0116 
(-1.13) 
-0.0129 
(-1.26) 
FOREIGN 0.2545 
(16.01***) 
0.2960 
(16.09***) 
0.2528 
(15.97***) 
0.2940 
(16.04***) 
EXORD 0.1661 
(11.23***) 
0.1632 
(11.04***) 
0.1663 
(11.25***) 
0.1634 
(11.06***) 
RNDTA 0.4590 
(7.66***) 
0.4427 
(7.34***) 
0.4581 
(7.70***) 
0.4418 
(7.38***) 
AUDCHG -0.1123 
(-4.20***) 
-0.0700 
(-2.46**) 
-0.1114 
(-4.18***) 
-0.0694 
(-2.44**) 
LAMDA 
 
 0.3844 
(4.41***) 
 0.3817 
(4.39***) 
Intercept 0.5956 
(8.02***) 
-0.5430 
(-2.03**) 
0.5618 
(7.58***) 
-0.5688 
(-2.13**) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
N 9,087 9,087 9,087 9,087 
Adjusted R2 0.8130 0.8134 0.8143 0.8147 
 
All t-statistics in parentheses are calculated using White’s (1980) consistent standard error estimates to 
correct for heteroskedasticity.  *, **, and *** denotes p-value<10%, p-value<5%, and p-value<1%, 
respectively with two-tailed tests. IC_D: 1 if the company receives internal control weakness opinion in 
fiscal year 2004 and 0 otherwise. YR0304: 1 if the fiscal year is 2003 or 2004 and 0 otherwise. See Table 1 
for the definitions of other variables. TYPEA: 1 if the client firm receive type A weakness opinion and 0 
otherwise. The ‘TYPE A’ weakness in internal control implies the weakness related to controls over specific 
account balances or transaction-level processes. 
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